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The paper discusses recent world income inequality calculations by Sala-i-
Martin. It shows that the two main problems with which the author had to 
grapple (too few data to derive countries’ income distributions, and sparseness 
of such data in time) are not solved in a satisfactory fashion. They, and several 
other simplifying assumptions, make Sala-i-Martin results very dubious.  We 
argue that Sala-i-Martin has ended up by producing a population-weighted   
inter-national distribution of income  augmented by a constant shift parameter 
and not a distribution of income among world citizens. 
                                                 
1 The two papers discussed here are: “The disturbing ‘rise’ in global income inequality” (version March 12, 
2001) published as NBER Working paper No. 8904 (April 2002) and called here Paper No. 1; and “The world 
distribution of income (estimated from individual country distributions” (version  May 1, 2002) published as 
NBER Working Paper No. 8905 (May 2002) and called here Paper No. 2. Both papers can be downloaded from 
http://www.columbia.edu/~xs23/home.html and www.nber.org.  
 
2 I am grateful to Prem Sangraula for research assistance, and to Sudhir Anand,  Yuri Dikhanov,  James K. 
Galbraith, Mark Gradstein, K. S. Jomo, Mattias Lundberg, Bosko Mijatovic, Mansoob Murshed, Danny Quah, 
Thomas Pogge, Martin Ravallion, Sanjay Reddy, Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Nicholas Stern, and Bernard Wasow for  
useful comments. I am very grateful to all, but the responsibility for the views expressed here is my own; no one 
else may be implicated. Similarly, the views expressed in  the paper should not be attributed to the World Bank, 
or its affiliated organizations. Author’s Email: bmilanovic@worldbank.org. 
  
1. Different types of inter-national inequality 
 
It has been well known for some time that inter-national inequality displays two 
contradictory features depending on whether we use population-weighted data or nor. As 
Figure 1 shows, if we use GDPs per capita with weights being the same for each country 
(Concept 1 inequality), there is a clear divergence in world incomes during the last twenty 
years. That divergence has been noticed by many researchers, and some like Mukand and 
Rodrik (2002) have wondered how to reconcile this divergence in outcomes with an apparent  
convergence in economic policy.  But if we use another concept of inter-national inequality 
(Concept 2 inequality) where GDPs per capita are weighted by population sizes, inter-national 
inequality is displaying an exactly opposite pattern: it has been decreasing during the last 
twenty years. This too has been noticed by researchers including myself (Milanovic, 2002a), 
but prior to that by Melchior, Telle and Wiig (2000), Schultz (1998) etc.  
 
Two points have not been widely appreciated though. First, that the decline in Concept 
2 inequality over the last 20 years in entirely explained by China. As Figure 2 shows, once 
China is excluded, there is no decline—rather a mild increase. 
3 Second, that this concept is 
only an approximation to what we would ideally like to measure, namely inequality across all 
individuals in the world.  In concept 2 inequality, we, of course, assign to each Chinese the 
mean income of China, and to each American the mean income of the US. The ranking 
criterion in both Concept 1 and Concept 2 is GDP per capita: nations (not individuals!) are 
ranked by their GDP per capita. It is only seemingly that we include the 1.2 billion Chinese 
and the 300 million Americans. The within-country inequality is entirely ignored. 
 
                                                 
3 Figures 1 and 2 are from Milanovic (2002a). Figure 1. Inter-national inequality: unweighted (Concept 1) 
and population weighted (Concept 2) 
 
Figure 2. Inter-national population weighted inequality without China  












































































So why was Concept 3 inequality (inequality across individuals of the world) not 
measured until very recently? The reason is that in order to measure it, one needs to have 
detailed households survey data from most of the countries of the world, hoping to cover at 
least 90 percent of world population and even more of world income. Moreover, one would 
need to actually have access to micro (individual-level) data for most of the countries in order 
to be able to check whether the welfare indicator (income or expenditure) is correctly defined, 
to create income or expenditure per capita values, to use survey-provided weights which are 
supposed to control for differences in response rates, and most importantly, to be able to 
“slice” the distribution into a lot of income classes—into ten deciles, or even better into 
ventiles (20 classes), or more.  
 
The number of household surveys, for many countries in the world, is quite limited. 
Even more limited is access to individual-level data because many countries are loath to 
release the detailed data to researchers. And, until fairly recently there were no surveys at all, 
or no reliable surveys, for many parts of the world. For example, no survey for China was 
available before 1982; there were no published survey results (much less access to individual-
level data) for the former Soviet Union, and almost all of Africa had been “uncovered” by 
surveys until some 10 to 15 years ago. So, even if theoretically, one had access to all 
household surveys conducted in the world, she could not have been able to do much 
calculations before the  mid- or late 1980’s. The is the reason why the only study so far to 
have used only household surveys (3/4 of which were available at the individual level) to 
calculate directly Concept 3 inequality (Milanovic, 2002) does this for three benchmark years, 
1988, 1993 and 1998.
4  
 
Several authors have, however, made some very broad approximations (Bourguignon, 
1999; Chotikapanich, Valenzuela and Rao, 1997) without claiming too much precision for 
their estimates.  Chotikapanich et al. explicitly treat theirs as a pis-aller, an approximation  
that is far from  ideal and that is necessary only because much better data are unavailable. Not 
only were  many important countries not represented in the data (household surveys being 
                                                 
4 The data can be downloaded from www.worldbank.org/research/inequality. 
 non-existent or not available), but for those that had surveys, neither individual nor decile data 
were in many cases available. Thus researchers like Chotikapanich, Valenzuela and Rao 
(1997) and Quah (1999 and 2002) had the following idea: why not use the information on 
Gini coefficient and mean income  (or country’s GDP) and impose lognormal distribution (the  
most common distribution of income) or Pareto distribution (less common) and get an 
estimate of income levels at different percentiles (10
th, 20
th and so forth). This is essentially 
what Sala-i-Martin—with whose recent two papers we are concerned here—has done as well 
except that instead of ‘’imposing’’ a lognormal (or any other distribution) on a few data 
points, he made a non-parametric (kernel) estimate of each distribution based on quintile 
shares  obtained from the Deininger-Squire (DS) data base for the period 1970-96,
5  and from 
World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) for the other two years (up to 1998). 
6 In 
Paper No. 1 the kernel function was applied to all data points (quintiles) of all countries taken 
together, that is, the data were all lined together as in a string, and then a density function was 
estimated across all of them. In Paper No. 2, Sala-i-Martin improves on this approach by 
estimating a kernel function for each distribution   separately—across the five quintile data for 
each country/year. The former is the estimation of “kernel of quintiles” (Paper No. 1); the 
latter is  “kernel of kernels” (Paper No. 2), and the differences are found to be negligible 
(Paper No. 2, p. 16). 
                                                 
5 Deininger and Squire do give in their much-used data base, information not only on Gini coefficients but on 
quintile shares—although the country coverage of the latter statistics is less. 
 
6 Sala-i-Martin writes that he is using both Deininger-Squire and World Development Indicators (WDI) quintile 
shares (Paper No.1, p. 10). He does not give the source for the latter (it must be various issues of WDI). These 
data  are also relatively few in number (compared to the Deininger-Squire compilation), and not as well 
documented. Thus, the entire discussion here will be based on the Deininger-Squire database version 2 which is 
also available on the Internet at http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/dddeisqu.htm. The issue of 
documentation (in particular whether we deal with distribution of household income across households, or 
distribution of per capita income across individuals) is extremely important and is not adequately addressed in 
WDI.  
 2. Enter Sala-i-Martin 
 
  One may wonder why Sala-i-Martin’s work would justify critical scrutiny more than 
the other mentioned papers. There are two reasons for this. First, unlike other authors quoted 
above  who explicitly acknowledge the limits of their data and estimations, Sala-i-Martin 
makes a bold claim  to have derived a distribution of income across world individuals and to 
have done this for the period of the last thirty years (and for each year). Second, his estimates 
are  widely quoted in professional and popular press. As of November 2003, Sala-i-Martin’s 
Website provides to its readers more than 30 newspaper references—in several languages—to 
the two papers. Some of those who quote his results are individuals of very high authority in 
economics.
7 They may be unaware or unfamiliar with different methodological and empirical 
choices made by Sala-i-Martin in his calculations.  Because of the sheer ambition of the 
claims made, and the publicity received, his work therefore requires careful scrutiny. As I 
hope to show here, his claims are unsound, both on methodological and empirical grounds. 
 
Selection of countries.  Let us consider first he list of countries included in Sala-i-
Martin’s estimations. Here it is as given by the author (Paper No.1, p.10). 
 
“Group A. Countries for which we have a time series of income shares by quintiles 
(by time series we  mean that we have a number of observations over time, although we may 
not have observations for every year between 1970 and 1998). 
 
Group B: countries for which we have only one observation between 1970 and 1998. 
 
Group C. Countries for which we have NO observations of income shares.” 
 
There are 68 countries in the Group A accounting for  4.7 billion people. Then, 
“although shares estimated by Deininger and Squire and the World Bank, are not constant, 
they do not seem to experience large movements. If anything they seem to have small time 
trends. Using this information, we regress income shares to get a linear trend for ach country.” 
(Paper No. 1, p. 10). 
                                                 
7 Paul Samuelson, Alan Greenspan and Robert Barro, according to the information provided on Sala-i-Martin’s 
Website (http://www.columbia.edu/~xs23/home.html).  
  
So, for group A for which there are observations, although, as it is delicately put,  “we 
may not have observations for every year”—we shall see below, that there is only one country 
which has observations for all the years—missing country/years are approximated by linear 
extrapolation. 
 
For group B of countries (29 countries, 315 million people), income shares are 
assumed constant for the entire period (that is, from one data point, information is 
extrapolated back and forth to all the years).  
 
For group C countries (28 countries,  232 million people) all citizens are supposed to 




There are some strange omission in the country coverage (given in the Appendix 2, 
Paper No.2)  Thus,  Russia is not included at all despite the fact that Deininger-Squire data 
base provides two observations and that the country is also included in WDI. Moreover, none 
of the former Soviet republics is included although  most of them are in the DS  database. 
Table 1 shows, for example, that there are 12 former Soviet republics in the Deininger-Squire 
data base with a total of 26 observations (not counting the observations from WDI). It  is very 
odd to leave them out. It is even stranger—and not without an effect on the results—if one 
realizes that these countries are precisely the ones characterized by significant increases in 
income inequality: the Russian Gini, for example, jumps from 24 to 48, Ukrainian from 23 to 
47, and very much the same for all the others. We shall show below that Sala-i-Martin’s 
calculations boil down to assuming within-country inequality to be fixed throughout the entire 
period, and if so, the inclusion of countries with large increases in inequality might have 
pushed overall inequality up, and invalidated his claim of decreasing world inequality.  
 
                                                 
8 The number of people included in each  Group differs somewhat between the two papers (cf. Paper No. 1, p. 10  
and Paper No. 2, Appendix, p. 65). 
 Sala-i-Martin discusses the non-inclusion of the former Soviet republics in a footnote 
in Paper No.2 (page 5), and claims (i) that these countries were not included because they did 
not exist prior to 1992, and (ii) that their omission does not bias world inequality. In his 
correspondence with me, Sala-i-Martin adduces yet another reason: these countries  were not 
included because Penn World Tables (which Sala-i-Martin uses to get GDP per capita 
numbers) do not include Russia, Ukraine etc. We shall address each of these explanations.  
 
The first explanation is rather lame, as Estonia with 4, Latvia and Russia with 3, or  
Ukraine with 2 observations have greater or equal number of observations  as (say) Egypt and 
Morocco which are both included.  The same rules as applied elsewhere—extrapolate from 
two or three observations to all the years—could have been applied to them. The fact that they 
are “new” countries is totally irrelevant. Here comes, however, Sala-i-Martin’s point that even 
if quintiles for these countries exist, GDPs per capita do not.  A glance at Penn World Tables 
5.5 and 5.6 (PWT) reveals however that the USSR is included from 1960 to 1989 with GDP 
per capita expressed in 1980 international dollars. Then, simply taking a ratio between 
Russia's current roubles or dollar GDP per capita in (say) 1980 and Soviet GDP per capita in 
1985 would have given Sala-i-Martin Russia's GDP per capita in international dollars of 
1980—the exact information that he needs. Once the benchmark value is available, one 
simply needs to apply Russian real growth rates available from any Russian Statistical 
Yearbook (or many international sources). The same holds for all other republics—15 of 
them. An alternative, and well-known, source would have been Maddison (1995, 2001) which 
gives the GDP per capita for the USSR for the entire 1950-98 period (see Table C1-c in 
Maddison, 2001). 
9   
 
There is another strange omission: that of Bulgaria. Now, Bulgaria is not a new 
country, and it is included in PWT for the entire period 1960-1992. Yet it  is not included in 
Sala-i-Martin’s calculations. Incidentally, it is  also a country with one of the largest number 
                                                 
9 Moreover, Maddison (1995, p. 142) gives Russia’s 1990 GDP per capita in 1990 international dollars. 
Conversion from Maddison’s numbers expressed in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars to Penn World 
Tables 5.6  values expressed in 1980 international dollars, or PWT 6.1 expressed in 1996 international dollars, is 
a fairly simple exercise. 
 of quintile data in the Deininger-Squire data base, so it cannot be a shortage of inequality 
measures that is to blame.  
  
 The second explanation (the omissions do not  bias the results) is wrong. Adding the 
Soviet republics,  Bulgaria, and  (former) Yugoslavia
10  together is adding about 350 million 
people or more than 6% of world population and some 7% of world PPP income in the late 
1980’s.  And as Milanovic (2002) shows, the transition countries (mostly former Soviet 
Union) account for about a half of  the 2.8 Gini point increase of “true” (Concept 3) world 
inequality between 1988 and 1993.  Thus Sala-i-Martin’s omission of these observations 
certainly biases overall inequality down. The reader can simply refer to Sala-i-Martin’s Gini 
values shown in Figure 8 below, and add for all the years after 1990, about 1½ Gini points. 
Instead of a clear downward trend, she would observe a  stable  Gini.
11 
 
                                                 
10 Yugoslavia (and its successor republics) is excluded despite having  9 observations. There are also a few other  
mysterious exclusions:  Iran (4 observations), the Bahamas (11 observations), Surinam (5 observations) and 
Vietnam (2 observations). Iran and Vietnam alone would have added more than 150 million people to Sala-i-
Martin’s sample. In PWT 6.1, the GDP per capita data for Iran are available from 1955, for Vietnam from 1983 
(see PWT 6.1, available at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/).  
 
11 Another curious fact is that not all of the transition countries are omitted: Czechoslovakia, despite the fact that 
it no longer exists (no more than the USSR)  is duly in the sample. One is unable to say how the two new 
countries are treated, where their GDP per capita data come from (PWT 5.6 gives the data for the whole of 
Czechoslovakia up to 1992; PWT 6.1 gives the data for the two republics from 1990 onwards). None of these 
things is explained.  Included are also Hungary and Poland. Now, it is precisely these three (or four) countries, 
the only ones among the transition countries, that have experienced but mild increases in inequality. In the 
Deininger-Squire database, the Gini for Poland goes up from 27 in 1989 to 28 in 1993, the Gini for Hungary 
increases from 23 to 32 and then drops back to 23, and the Czech Gini goes from 25 to 28. Compare this with 
Russian and Ukrainian increases of more than 20 Gini points. 
  
3. The Ricardian vice: fragmentary and sparse data overcome by making heroic and 
unwarranted assumptions 
 
The description of the estimation approach used by Sala-i-Martin already highlights 
the problems. The first problem has to do with very few data (quintiles) available to derive a 
distribution. We call this fragmentary data. The second problem has to do with the absence of 
even such fragmentary data for most of the years. These missing years then have to be filled 
in by extrapolations. We call this the problem of sparse data.  
 
We shall discuss, first, how entire distributions are derived from only five data points,  
and second, how these sparse data are combined in order to produce a semblance of a dense 
distribution in time,  or in simple terms how Sala-i-Martin moves from  having two or three 
observations for Egypt, Switzerland or Greece over the 29 year period to “pretending” that he 
has all of them. 
12  
 
Fragmentary data.  First, we should note that that the Deininger-Squire quintiles used 
to derive distributions are often not calculated from primary household-level observations, but 
from grouped data and were estimated by fitting the Lorenz curves. Thus, quintiles which are 
themselves estimates are used to estimate the entire distributions. 
13 
 
Then, notice that once a researcher has decided to either impose a distribution using a 
few data points, or to do a non-parametric estimation also using a few data points, there is 
nothing stopping him/her from estimating income levels at any point in income distribution: 
one does not need to stop at deciles or even centiles, one author went all the way to 
millesimes, estimating the distribution for each one-tenth of a percentile.
14 But notice too that 
these are still very much estimates, rather guesses, and, as we shall show below, once they are 
made from very few data points, they are very rough and quite likely very inaccurate 
                                                 
12 In terms of the actual steps made by Sala-i-Martin, first comes the estimation of  quintile shares for all the 
years and then the derivation of kernel density functions. But for discussion, it is easier to reverse the order. 
 
13 This was drawn to my attention by Martin Ravallion. 
 
14 The paper, which I was asked to referee, belongs to an anonymous author. I do not know if it was published. estimates as well. Actually, before Sala-i-Martin no-one has done what he has, for no-one was 
as wiling and eager to push the art of approximation so far. The reason was not that the data  
were not there  (the Deininger-Squire data base has been available since 1995) nor that the 
methodology, as we have just mentioned,  was unknown. It is simply that no one thought that 
the heroic assumption that ought to be made were defensible or justified—or in other words, 
that the results based on such heroic assumptions would make much sense.  
 
A differencia specifica of Sala-i-Martin’s is the use of non-parametric estimates of the 
density functions. At first this seems to be an improvement: one does not impose an a priori 
function on the data. On the data…But how many data points there are? Five in all cases. 
Normally, we use non-parametric estimates in order to create some sense out of a plethora of 
data points—to derive regularities from the many “noisy” observations.  It is for example 
common to use non-parametric estimates of food-ratios from household survey data: we want 
to “extract” an Engel curve from thousands of recalcitrant and often “noisy” data. But here we 
deal with the exactly the opposite problem: we have  five observations and we need to 
“stretch” them into producing literally a hundred observations. How is this miracle 
performed? I have used the individual-level Malaysian data for the year 1997. Figure 3 shows 
income density function estimated from such micro data by applying a non-parametric kernel 
estimate. The shape is a familiar one: (log) normal.  I have then created five quintiles from the 
individual data, and applied to these five quintiles Sala-i-Martin’s Gaussian kernel with the 
suggested  bandwidth of 0.35.
15  Figure 4 shows Sala-i-Martin’s approximation. Picture is 
worth a thousand words…
16 
                                                 
15 In Paper No. 2, Sala-i-Martin approximates a density function for each country/year separately, and so the 
optimal bandwidth should, in principle, vary between the countries. He settles though on a common bandwidth 
of 0.35. 
 
16 I have performed the same calculation for three other countries (Brazil 1998, Italy 1998,  Pakistan 1997). Not 

































 But the problem of too few data to derive a distribution does not end here. Consider 
the example of China where Sala-i-Martin has the following five (cumulative) quintile shares 
for 1992: (0.062, 0.1672, 0.3253, 0.5835 and 1). Based on these five values (and GDP per 
capita) Sala-i-Martin estimates a kernel density function. But to derive a distribution based on 
five data points is to subject oneself  to a very large degree of error (as illustrated by Figures 3 
and 4).  It is not only that “stretching” the five data points to represent a hundred is wrong, or 
that, depending on the smoothing techniques (bandwidth)  and the assumption one makes 
(what type of kernel density function),  vastly different results can be obtained—all 
compatible with the five numbers we have. It is that even if different kernels yield similar 
results, it still does not guarantee that we have “guessed” right—simply because income 
density function is an empirical function where, with five numbers we have, we cannot at all 
be sure to have approximated it correctly. We know that the bottom 20% of people of China 
receive 6.2% of total income. But this value is consistent with the bottom decile receiving 2% 
of total income, or 2.5%, or even only 1%. For the top, it is even worse, and that is where 
most of the mistake (and bias) lies. We know that the top quintile gets 41.65% of income. But 
how about the top decile? Do they get only 23% percent—which should be consistent with a 
relatively equal distribution—or perhaps 28 percent. 
17 On per capita basis, the difference 
amounts to about  20 percent of income for about 120 million people or 2 percent of world 
population. And how about the top ventile (5 percent)? The margin of error is even greater 
there.  
 
Or, take the United States, where the top quintile in 1996 receives 48.9 percent of total 
income, and the fourth quintile gets 27.8 percent. Applying the same logic: does the top decile 
get 25 percent of total income  (just minimally more than the ninth decile), or a little under 35 
percent? The difference in the top decile average income estimate is 40 percent, and per capita 
income of the top decile may range between $PPP 69,700 and $PPP 97,580 per capita per 
                                                 
17 We know that they cannot get more. The average income of the fourth quintile is (0.5853-0.3253)/0.2=1.29 
times greater than the mean. The ninth decile thus must receive more than 1.29*10=12.9 percent of total income, 
which limits the top decile to less than  28.7 percent (41.65-12.9). 
 year. 
18 Whether we choose one or another income for these 30 million people, probably the 
most affluent  in the world, will make a difference to our inequality calculations. For the 
difference is far from negligible: it amounts to 1.8 percent of total world income!
19 
 
Sparse data. Let us now move to the sparseness of the data which is an even more 
serious problem. Table 1 shows the list of countries and  number of observations available in 
the D-S database.  There are 630 observations. After eliminating countries not included in 
Sala-i-Martin’s calculations, we are left with 532 observations.
20  The average number of 
observations for  Groups A and  B is 5.5 out of 27 (years), which means that—for the 
countries for which the data are available—only about 20 percent of country/years are filled. 
(This is graphically shown in Table 2 where a black box indicates that an observation is 
available.)  If we require, not unreasonably for a study that claims to have derived income 
inequality statistics for each year over the period, that a country should have observations for 
at least two-thirds of the time (that is, to have more than 18 observations), we are left with a 
total of six countries: USA, Bulgaria, Taiwan, Great Britain, Canada and Japan. 
21  Only one 
country—the US—has observations for all the years. 
 
Sala-i-Martin presents to the reader his results as if there we no blanks at all in the 
data. As we already know, he gets round blank spots by extrapolating forward and backward 
in time the results obtained from the years for which he has the data. Thus the Chilean black 
                                                 
18 Calculated by taking the 1996 GDP per capita  (27,880 in 1995 international dollars) and multiplying by 
factors or 2.5 and 3.5. (If the top decile gets between 25 and 35 percent of total US income, then average per 
capita income of its members is between 2.5 and 3.5 times the US average.) 
 
19 Calculated as follows. The US per capita GDP in 1996 was 3.72 times higher than the world GDP per capita. 
Then, the mean income of the top US decile is anything between 9.3 and 13 times mean world income. Since US 
top decile comprises about ½ of a percent of world population, their share in world income ranges between 4.7 
and 6.5 percent.  
 
20 The period covered by the Deininger-Squire database runs up to 1996. Sala-i-Martin’s data (thanks to WDIs) 
extend into 1998. The difference cannot but be  minor. 
 
21 And to complicate matters further, the Japanese surveys from which these data are derived are not nationally 
representative because they leave out farmers and one-person households, that is,  ten percent of the population 
(see Tachibanaki and Yagi, 1997).  And Bulgaria is, as we have seen, not included. 
 boxes for the years 1981, 1989 and 1994 are used  to fill the blank spots for all earlier and 
later years (24 in total) assuming that quintile shares follow a linear trend. 
22 
 
But the extrapolations are not at all obvious. Consider the data for China’s fourth 
quintile (used here because of  China’s obvious importance) over the period 1980-92 (Figure 
5, left panel).  There seems to be an increasing tendency—but, on the other hand, isn’t it 
driven by the value for 1991 when after the Tian-An Men massacre, there was a tightening of 
government policies and a reduction of inequalities, and didn’t the value in 1992 already go 
back to where it was in 1986? Sala-i-Martin chooses to draw a straight line: the fourth quintile 
in all years, shown here as well as all the way back to 1970 (when the first national survey 




Figure 5. Income share of the fourth quintile in China (left) and first quintile in Brazil (right) 
 
Source: Deininger-Squire data base Version 2. 
                                                 
22 Sala-i-Martin must have felt, one would surmise, vaguely uncomfortable about these extrapolation as nowhere 
in the two papers does he give the number of observations available by country. And few things  would have 
been easier  (and  more useful) to the reader than such essential information  which could have been readily 
added to the Appendix table (in Paper No.2) where all countries and their populations (sic!) are listed. Equally 
revealing is the fact that in Paper No.1, Appendix Table 1 lists all the countries and Groups to which they belong 








1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000Table 2 get filled with black dots. For many countries quintile shares exhibit a large 
variability: rather than moving in predictable ways, or being stable, they “jump” all around 
(see Sala-i-Martin Appendix Figures, Paper No.2, or Brazil in  Figure 3 here). One is 
reminded of Samuelson’s quip: “yes, you can draw them as straight lines, but only with a very 
thick chalk.” 
 
So, after being treated to an estimate of the entire distributions from five data points, 
we are now led for another leap into the unknown. These very dubious annual estimates are 
now extrapolated to years vastly apart to get estimates of quintile shares throughout the entire 
period. Here is the enormity of the assumptions. Data on income of the top 20% of  (say) 
Chileans in the year 1994 are used not only to infer the income of the top decile, or of the top 
ventile in that year. They are also used to infer income of the bottom quintile and of the 
bottom decile and of the bottom 15% or whatever (that is, of the entire distribution) in  all 
other years. 
23 And thus for every country. 
 
We have seen that for Group A and B countries (97 countries),  observations are 
available for, on average,  only 5.5  out of 27 years. For 28 countries in Group C, there are no 
data at all. This means that the overall time coverage is 15.8 percent—leaving aside the 
former Soviet republics, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Vietnam, Iran etc. which are not included at 
all.
24 If in addition, we assume that for a distribution to be reasonably well described, we need 
ten data points (ten deciles), the desirable number of data-points becomes 27 times 125 times 
10 = 33750. Instead,  Sala-i-Martin has 2667 data points,
25 or 7.9 percent.  
 
Here is the deep-rooted problem with Sala-i-Martin’s calculations. He tries to  
overcome the problem of  fragmentary data by imposing a distribution on them. Given the 
very few data points—some of which may themselves be fitted approximations—it is a 
dramatic oversimplification with  an  unknown bias. But in addition, he faces the problem of 
                                                 
23 This is because n-th quintile share in year t, influences our linear approximation of that and all other quintile 
shares (since the five shares have to add up to 1) in all the years for which one does the extrapolations. 
 
24 Out of total maximum number of country/years, 27 times 125 = 3375, there are only 97 times 5.5 = 532 
observations. 
 
25 97 x 5.5 x 5. data sparseness. He overcomes it  by extending in time these largely arbitrary estimations 
obtained from the country/years for which he had the data!  “He then piled one simplifying 
assumption upon another until, having really settled everything by these assumptions, he was 
left with only a few aggregate variables between which, given these assumptions, he set up 
simpler one-way relations so that, in the end, the desired results emerged almost as  
tautologies.”  Thus Schumpeter (1980 [1954], p. 472-3) defined the Ricardian vice.  
 
  In conclusion, to calculate true world inequality there is no shortcut from using the 
individual-level data complemented  (when individual data are unavailable) with grouped data 
with at least decile shares. To do anything else, introduces a large and unknown degree of 
arbitrariness in the results. This, combined with other problems (discussed below) and the 
general issues that plague such calculations even if one had access to all individual-level data 
(unequal reliability of surveys, differences in the definitions of welfare aggregates and the 
like) makes the noise element dominate, by far, the signal.    
4. Other problems 
 
 
  We are not at the end of the problems yet. There are three more. 
 
  The first is the use of GDP per capita rather then survey means. This was done by 
other authors as well (Chotikapanich, Valenzuela and Rao, 1997; Schultz 1998; Bhalla, 2002). 
There are two problems with this approach. First, it introduces an inconsistency: we use and 
trust household survey data for the distributions, but we do not believe their means. In other 
words, surveys are good in guessing distributions, but they  miss the means (income levels). 
Some authors like Surjit Bhalla (2002) have insisted on this issue by claiming that survey 
means (as is apparently the case in India) underestimate true income, and have erected the 
negative difference between the survey means and GDP  per capita from an issue that may (or 
may not: the extensive debate on this in India is not conclusive) hold for India, into a general 
proposition for all countries and all time.  Second, the use of GDP per capita means that we 
implicitly believe that over- or under-estimation of income by surveys is proportional to 
reported income. If GDP per capita is 20 percent higher than the survey mean, by raising all 
survey incomes by 20 percent we are claiming that under-reporting is proportional to reported 
income. But, from the literature (see Ravallion, 2001 p. 1805;  Ravallion, 2000, pp. 3250-1 in 
the context of India, or Wagner and Grabka, 1999 for Germany) we know that this is not the 
case. If there is a misstatement of survey incomes, it is most at low ends (where people are 
missed by surveys) and top ends (where people hide their incomes, or where income types 
associated with rich people are imperfectly reported). 
26  As Ravallion (2000) writes, there is 
an internal inconsistency in use of national accounts data instead of household survey means. 
As the two have diverged in time in India, the adjustment factor by which survey means have 
been raised, has also increased. But at the same time, the authors persist in increasing income 
of all recipients by the same percentage for any given year. Thus, they need to argue that “the 
rate underestimation is roughly constant between people at one date, but…it has risen over 
                                                 
26 There are several ways in which this underreporting takes place. First, there is “top-coding” (maximum 
acceptable value) for some income components like capital gains in the US Census Survey (top coded at $99,999 
per household). Other countries (Germany) do the same. Second, there is a consistent underestimation of income 
sources associated with the rich. Property income is underestimated by  60 percent in France (Concialdi, 1997, p. 
261) and by more than 40 percent in Germany (Wagner and Grabka, 1999). time with growth in mean consumption (Ravallion, 2000, p. 3250). In conclusion, if we do not 
believe survey levels, and want to correct them, adjusting them by the same percentage across 
the board is very crude and almost surely wrong. 
 
  The second problem is mixing of income and expenditure data. This is the problem 
present in Milanovic (2002) as well. It is made unavoidable by the fact that countries 
“specialize” in having either income or expenditure surveys, and then the coverage of the 
whole world by either income or expenditure surveys alone becomes impossible. Sala-i-
Martin, as well as the Deininger-Squire database, also mixes the two sources: the quintiles are 
in some cases derived from expenditure (or consumption) shares, and in some from income 
shares. 
 
  The third, and a very serious issue, is the mixing of quintile shares obtained from 
distributions of households with quintile shares derived from distributions of individuals. One 
is the distribution of households by household income, denoted D(H|Yh),  and another is 
distribution of persons by household per capita income, denoted D(p|Yp). 
27  The latter is, of 
course, the one that we want to use. Sala-i-Martin does not mention explicitly that he is 
combining the two sources. However, by comparing the total number of observations used by 
Sala-i-Martin from the Deininger-Squire data base (about 540) with the total number of both 
household- and individual-based quintile shares available in the D-S base for the period after 
1970 (about 600), and taking into account that about 50 observations (Bulgaria, Russia, Iran 
etc.) have not been used, it becomes clear that Sala-i-Martin must have combined D(p|Yp) and 
D(H|Yh)  distributions. The D(H|Yh) distributions account for about 40 percent of the D-S 
database. Thus, had they not been used, Sala-i-Martin’s number of observations would have 
been significantly smaller (about 350). The use of  the wrong distribution D(H|Yh) makes a 
total mess of  world inequality calculations as now the issues of family size (vastly different 
between countries)  and  inconsistency in the  recipient units entirely vitiate the calculations, 
making them simply meaningless. The five data points representing a distribution of 
households by total household income in a country X in a year t  are now interpreted to be the 
                                                 
27 To complicate matters further, there are also distributions of households by household per capita income 
D(H|Yp) but they are few in numbers. 
 same as (i) the distribution of people by their per capita income, and is used to guess (ii) the 
entire income distribution of people for year t, and (iii) for many years forward and backward. 
28 
 
  Moreover, even here, and rather surprisingly, lurks an additional source of bias. For 
some unknown reason, the Deininger-Squire data uses much more of household-based 
D(H|Yh) information for the period up to the 1990’s. Table 3 gives the share of household- 
vs. individual-based quintiles for each decade used by the Deininger-Squire. Since D(H|Yh) 
distributions are generally more unequal than D(p|Yp) distributions, the overall (or average) 
level of inequality in the 1990’s will tend to be relatively low. As a result, the actual increase 
in inequality which  took place in the decades of the 1980’s and 1990’s, and which is plain to 
see when we control for the type of recipient—that is, if we include only observations based 
on distributions of persons—will  fail to show in the data when D(H|Yh) and D(p|Yp) are 
mixed together. This is illustrated in Figure 6.  
 
Table 3. The two types of distributions used in the Deininger-Squire database 
 




Share of D(H|Yh) 
observations in total 
1960’s 32  43  0.57 
1970’s 60  93  0.61 
1980’s 123  105  0.46 
1990’s 146  17  0.10 
Source: Calculated from the Deininger-Squire database version 2. 
                                                 
28 Facing the same problem of mixing household- and person-based data (and also using the D-S database), 
Schultz (1999) decides not to do the mixing: “Without a theory or a reliable procedure for relating the processes 
generating household and person income distributions…I am reluctant to mix the data on households and 
persons, because ot could conceal important regularities” (p. 324).  
Figure 6. Mean Ginis in each decade (1960’s to 1990’s) 
 
Source: calculated from the Deininger-Squire database version 2 
 
And it is not that the results in Figure 6 are driven by some odd high-Gini outliers in 
the 1990’s. Figure 7 (left panel) shows the distribution of the Ginis in the 1970’s and 1990’s 
when persons and households are mixed up: the two distributions are practically the same. 
Figure  7 (right panel) shows the distribution of countries’ Ginis when the concept (income 
per capita across persons) is held constant. Now, it is not only that the mean and the median 
Gini are higher in the 1990’s—the entire distribution of the Ginis has shifted rightward. This 
is hardly surprising since we know that in the 1990’s there was another bout of increases in 
inequality, this time in transition countries, China, India and parts of Latin America. The use 
of the mixed household- and individual- data will then additionally bias Sala-i-Martin’s 
calculations downward. It is important to note, however, that this effect is accidental: it just so 
happened that the D-S database includes less of household-based observations in the 1990’s. 













Keeping the same  
concept (only persons)
Using both persons and 
householdsdriven by the need to stretch the number of observations way beyond what the data allow, one 
commits biases whose very direction cannot be gauged.  
 
 
Figure 7. Distribution of Gini coefficients from the Deininger-Squire data base 
 
 
Mixing households and persons  





















1990’s 5. The bottom line 
 
  The bottom line is that it is not surprising the purported Concept 3 inequality as 
calculated by Sala-i-Martin behaves almost identically as the Concept 2 inequality (see Figure 
8) . This is because the “fitting” of distributions based on very fragmentary data, plus the 
extrapolations in time, had emptied out almost all variability from the within-country 
component. Basically, within-country inequality is fixed—by the elimination of 
“troublesome” (high inequality) countries, by the minimization of distributions’ variability 
through the use of very few data points and linear extrapolations, by the assumption that all 
countries whose distributions are unavailable exhibit perfect equality, and by the mixing of 
household- and person-based distributions. It is the within-country inequality, which 
superimposed onto Concept 2 inequality, yields inequality among world’s individuals. If 
within-country inequality is fixed (and countries’ relative positions do not change much),
29 
then what is superimposed on the Concept 2 inequality is simply a shift parameter.  
 
It is not surprising then that the evolution through time of what is ostensibly a Concept 
3 inequality will be the same as the evolution in time of the Concept 2 inequality—as indeed 
we see in Figure 8. One might conclude  that what Sala-i-Martin has ended up by  producing 
is inequality between population-weighted GDPs per capita which simply masquerades as 
inequality between individuals, or more exactly, a Concept 2 inequality with a constant shift 
parameter. 
                                                 
29 Note that even if all within-country distributions are unchanged, but some countries grow faster (or slower) 
than others (so that their relative position changes), inequality between individuals of the world will change too. 
  




While Sala-i-Martin’s results move in parallel with the Concept 2 inequality, they 
move out of step with all other calculations of Concept 3 inequality. Figure 9 confronts Sala-i-
Martin’s results with other authors who have tried to calculate world inequality among 
individuals.  Sala-i-Martin’s is the only calculation that shows inequality steadily decreasing 
during the last 30 years. All others show inequality on the rise, or going up and down without 
an apparent trend.  Sala-i-Martin results give also, by far, the lowest Gini of all other 
calculations. Around 1993, the median estimate of other calculations is Gini between  64-65. 






















































Concept 2 inequality 
Figure 9. Sala-i-Martin’s calculations confronted to others 
 
Sources: Milanovic (2002 and for 1998 estimate from 2002a), Bourguignon and Morrisson (1999), 




  To conclude, Sala-i-Martin  has succumbed to the temptation of  piling one 
assumption upon another with the result that neither the author, nor the reader can any longer 
tell which is the part of each assumptions, individually or together, in deriving the final result. 
Here are, in summary, the Ricardian building blocks used by Sala-i-Martin  in his 
calculations—with (*) signs indicating the assumptions imparting unambiguous downward 
bias to the results:  
 
  1.  (*) A strange omission of countries with “disturbing rises” in inequality; then,  
 
2.  Use five data points to approximate entire distributions. 
 
3.  When these five data points are not available (84 percent of the time), extrapolate 












































Chotiapanich-Val.-Raodistribution stays the same for 30 years; (*) when there is no observation at all, 
assume everybody in the country has the same income. 
 
4.  (*) Treat distributions of household income across households as if they were 
distributions of  per capita income across individuals. 
 
5.  Mix National accounts data (GDP per capita) and household survey data. 
 
6. Mix  expenditure  and income data. 
 
 
and produce world income distribution across individuals of the world for the last 
thirty years. To paraphrase, “never was so much calculated with so little.” And, unfortunately, 
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 Table 1. List of countries and number of observations in 
Deininger-Squire data base (version 2), period 1970-96 
United States of America  27  Panama  5  Turkey  2 
Bulgaria 24  Surinam  5  Tanzania  2 
Taiwan 23  Czech  Rep  4  Uganda  2 
United Kingdom  22  Dominican Rep  4  Uzbekistan  2 
Canada 18  Estonia  4  Vietnam  2 
Japan 18  Ghana  4  Burkina  Faso  1 
Poland 17  Iran  4  Bolivia  1 
Italy 16  Peru  4  Barbados  1 
Brazil 15  Philippines  4  Botswana  1 
Sweden  15  Portugal  4  Central African Rep 1 
Finland 13  Tunisia  4  Chile  1 
India 13  Zimbabwe  4  Cameroon  1 
Netherland 13  Belgium  4  Djibouti  1 
China 12  Chile  4  Ecuador  1 
New Zealand  12  Greece  3  Ethopia  1 
Australia 11  Guatemala  3  Fiji  1 
Bahamas 11  Ireland  3  Guinea  1 
Indonesia 10  Jordan  3  Gambia  1 
Venezuela 10  Lithuania  3  Guinea  Bissau  1 
Costa Rica  9  Latvia  3  Guyana  1 
Yugoslavia 9  Moldova  3  Israel  1 
Bangladesh 8  Mauritius  3  Kenya  1 
Colombia 8  Nigeria 3  Laos 1 
Czechoslovakia 8  Romania  3  Lesotho 1 
Spain 8  Slovakia  3  Madagascar  1 
Jamaica 8  Slovenia  3  Mali  1 
Norway 8  Trinidad  &  Tobago  3  Mongolia  1 
Pakistan 8  Ukraine  3  Malawi  1 
Germany 7  Belarus  2  Niger 1 
Hong Kong  7  Algeria  2  Nicaragua 1 
Honduras 7  Egypt  2  Nepal 1 
Hungary  7  Gabon  2  Papua New Guinea  1 
Korea, South  7  Kazakhstan  2  Paraguay  1 
Sri Lanka  7  Kyrgyz  2  Rwanda  1 
Denmark 6  Luxembourg  2  Senegal  1 
France 6  Morocco  2  Sierra  leone  1 
Malaysia 6  Mauritania  2  Yemen  1 
Singapore 6  Puerto  Rico 2  South  Africa  1 
Thailand 6  Russia  2  Switzerland  1 
Cote d'Ivoire  5  El Salvador  2  Armenia  1 
Mexico 5  Seychelles  2  Austria  1 
   Turkmenistan  2  Total 630 
 
  
Table 2. Quintiles available in Deininger-Squire data base 
(cases where recipients are persons) and used by Sala-i-Martin 
 
code  70  71  72  73  74  75  76  77  78  79  80  81  82  83  84  85  86  87  88  89  90  91  92  93  94  95  96 
AGO                                                                                  
ALB                                                                                  
ARG                                                                                  
ARM                                                                                 
AUS                                                                              
AUT                                                                                 
BEL                                                                                 
BEN                                                                                  
BFA                                                                                 
BGD                                                                                
BGR                                                                                
BHS                                                                                  
BLR                                                                                
BOL                                                                                 
BRA                                                                            
BRB                                                                                  
BWA                                                                                  
CAF                                                                                 
CAN                                                                               
CHE                                                                                 
CHL                                                                               
CHN                                                                                
CIV                                                                                
CMR                                                                                 
COG                                                                                  
COL                                                                               
CRI                                                                               
CSK                                                                            
CZE                                                                                 
DEU                                                                               
DJI                                                                                  
DNK                                                                               
DOM                                                                              
DZA                                                                                ECU                                                                                 
EGY                                                                                 
ESP                                                                                 
EST                                                                               
ETH                                                                                  
FIN                                                                              
FJI                                                                                  
FRA                                                                               
GAB                                                                                  
GBR                                                                                 
GHA                                                                                
GIN                                                                                 
GMB                                                                                 
GNB                                                                                 
GRC                                                                                  
GTM                                                                                
GUY                                                                                 
HKG                                                                                  
HND                                                                                
HRV                                                                                  
HTI                                                                                  
HUN                                                                            
IDN                                                                         
IND                                                                            
IRL                                                                                 
IRN                                                                                
ISR                                                                                 
ITA                                                                               
JAM                                                                                 
JOR                                                                               
JPN                                                                                
KAZ                                                                                
KEN                                                                                 
KGZ                                                                                
KHM                                                                                  
KOR                                                                                  
KWT                                                                                  
LAO                                                                                 LKA                                                                                 
LSO                                                                                 
LTU                                                                                
LUX                                                                                 
LVA                                                                               
MAR                                                                                
MDA                                                                                
MDG                                                                                 
MEX                                                                               
MLI                                                                                 
MNG                                                                                 
MOZ                                                                                  
MRT                                                                                
MUS                                                                                
MWI                                                                                 
MYS                                                                                 
NER                                                                                 
NGA                                                                                
NIC                                                                                 
NLD                                                                              
NOR                                                                               
NPL                                                                                 
NZL                                                                                  
PAK                                                                                 
PAN                                                                               
PER                                                                               
PHL                                                                                
PNG                                                                                  
POL                                                                                 
PRI                                                                                  
PRT                                                                                  
PRY                                                                                 
ROM                                                                                 
RUS                                                                                
RWA                                                                                 
SAU                                                                                  
SDN                                                                                  
SEN                                                                                 SGP                                                                                  
SLE                                                                                 
SLV                                                                                 
SUN                                                                               
SVK                                                                                
SVN                                                                                
SWE                                                                              
SYC                                                                                 
TCD                                                                                  
TGO                                                                                  
THA                                                                                  
TKM                                                                                
TTO                                                                                  
TUN                                                                              
TUR                                                                                  
TWN                                                                                
TZA                                                                                
UGA                                                                                
UKR                                                                               
URY                                                                                  
USA                                                                                 
UZB                                                                                
VEN                                                                             
VNM                                                                                 
YEM                                                                                 
YUF                                                                                  
YUG                                                                               
ZAF                                                                                  
ZAR                                                                                  
ZMB                                                                                
ZWE                                                                                 
 
 